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Supremacy of Law or Religion: Congress’s Power to Amend




Separation of powers is an age-old concept of democratic govern-
ance that permeates democratic regimes around the world.  Montes-
quieu, one of the greatest political philosophers provided one of the
first articulations of this concept, conditioning any successful demo-
cratic regime upon it.1  Ever since he introduced this idea in the Spirit
of the Laws, democracies around the world began to adopt this model,
modifying it somewhat from country to country to fit their peculiar
political realities.2  These ideas were also picked up by the Founding
Fathers3 subsequently becoming intrinsic to the American form of de-
mocracy.4  Although the concept might seem easy to adopt, in many
cases the line that divides the powers is less than clear, which creates a
constant struggle between the three branches of the government.
* Roman Sankovych is a J.D. candidate, Class of 2017, at DePaul University College of Law,
Executive Editor of the DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal, and a member of the
DePaul Appellate Moot Court Society.  He earned an A.A.S. (Junior Specialist) degree (with
distinction) in Ukrainian Legal Studies at Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University Col-
lege of Law (Ukraine) as well as a B.A. degree at DePaul University, majoring in Political Sci-
ence with a minor in Economics.  The author would like to thank members of the Editorial
Board of the DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal for their comments.
1. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., Anne M.
Cohler et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (“[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive.  Were it joined with the legislative,
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be
then the legislator.  Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence
and oppression.”).
2. See, e.g., KONSTYTUTSIIA UKRAINY [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (Ukr.) (“State power in Ukraine
is exercised on the principles of its division into legislative, executive, and judicial power.”)
(clearly stating that the division of powers); see also U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III (embodying the
principle of separation of power only implicitly by assigning to each branch of the government its
specific functions).
3. In Federalist 47, James Madison wrote, “The oracle who is always consulted and cited on
this subject [of separation of powers] is the celebrated Montesquieu.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47
(James Madison).
4. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III (establishing three branches of the government with each having
enumerated powers and duties).
185
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The inter-branch tension is not novel in the United States, and it
often encourages a plethora of policy discussion between the branches
that, in the long run, benefits the American people.  One of the most
prominent examples of such tension is the “court-packing” attempt of
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to curb the unruly Supreme
Court by expanding the number of its members and appointing the
loyal candidates in the newly created seats.5  Tensions also exist be-
tween the legislative branch and the judiciary when Congress’s actions
aimed at overruling various Supreme Court interpretations of the law.
For example, a passing of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 19876
was a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College
v. Bell7 where, according to Congress, the Court “unduly narrowed or
cast doubt upon the broad application of [federal civil rights stat-
utes].”8  Very often these inter-branch conflicts get resolved in a way
that benefits the citizens of the United States as a whole,9 albeit such a
positive resolution could take a long time.10  Congress, however, is not
immune to making mistakes.
One of the most controversial types of congressional activity is to
undo Supreme Court’s interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.  These
efforts of Congress are usually aimed at curtailing one of the most
significant powers of the Supreme Court – the power of judicial re-
view established in Marbury v. Madison.11  The Court’s power of judi-
cial review lies in the center of the present inter-branch struggle
around the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199312 (“RFRA”).
On the one hand, RFRA, a legislative act, makes all law subject to its
scrutiny,13 correcting the Supreme Court’s abolition of “strict scru-
5. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Legacy of the Court-Packing Plan: A Quarter-Century After
F.D.R. Began His Unsuccessful Battle over the Supreme Court, the Tribunal’s Attitudes are
Changed but Its Independence is as Secure as Ever, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1962 at 12 (reflecting on
the history and effects of Roosevelt’s “court-packing” efforts).
6. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 29, 42
U.S.C.).
7. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
8. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 § 2.
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (abolishing the discriminatory “sepa-
rate but equal” policy authorized by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
10. Brown was decided 58 years after Plessy established “separate but equal” framework.
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court famously said
that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
13. Id. § 2000bb-3(a)-(b) (“[RFRA] applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that
law, whether statutory or otherwise . . . . Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993
is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this
chapter.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB204.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-JUN-17 13:07
2017] SUPREMACY OF LAW OR RELIGION 187
tiny” inquiry in the cases involving the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and instructing the courts to use the “strict scru-
tiny” test in these cases.14  However, at the same time, the Supreme
Court issues decisions that expand and enhance citizens’ constitu-
tional right, seemingly ignoring RFRA,15 planting seeds of uncertainty
in the minds of citizens and lawyers alike.  On the other hand, the
Supreme Court issues decisions like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.,16 where it invalidates a provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)17 because it fails the strict scrutiny test
established in RFRA.18  This decision both reaffirms and validates
RFRA.  This uncertainty as to RFRA’s place in the hierarchy of law
provides a fertile ground for discussion about the limits of Congress’s
corrective action as to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Constitution.
This Comment’s goal is to question the “supremacy” of RFRA be-
cause, as it stands now, RFRA appears to enjoy supremacy above
other federal and state laws as it subordinates these laws to its strict-
scrutiny test.  This Comment, first, gives a brief historical background
of the Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. company, as well as the evolution of
the religious freedom concept in the United States.  In Part III of this
Comment, the discussion centers on the dubious quasi-constitutional
status that Congress afforded to RFRA, which was ignored by the Su-
preme Court in Hobby Lobby.  Part IV concludes the discussion by
suggesting that the entire framework of RFRA stands on very shaky
constitutional grounds, and, thus, the outcome of Hobby Lobby
should be reversed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is an idiosyncratic corporation on the cor-
porate map of the United States.  It is a closely held, family-owned
14. See Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of
Religion, 84 UMKC L. REV. 749, 763 (2016) (discussing the origins of RFRA).
15. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (recognizing a right of same-sex
couples to get married as a constitutional right that is enforceable in all states of the United
States).
16. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
17. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified in various sections of U.S.C.).
18. Hobby Lobby,134 S. Ct. at 2785. (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held
corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to
reach the First Amendment claim.”).
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corporation incorporated in Oklahoma.19  While family ownership is
generally an attribute of close corporations,20 suggesting a small-to
medium-sized enterprise, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is more like a
large publicly traded corporation: it has around 750 stores throughout
the United States;21 it occupies a 9.2 million-square-foot headquarters
complex;22 it employs 32,000 people;23 and, in 2015, it generated $4
billion in revenue.24  These features put Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. on
Forbes’ list of America’s Largest Private Corporations.25  These num-
bers put it in the same group as big, publicly held corporations like
Facebook26 or British Petroleum27 that occupy a significant share of
the U.S. market.  The volume of the company and its family-based
ownership, however, do not end the list of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.’s
peculiarities.
The company is also unique in its approach to conducting business.
The company’s mission statement will surprise an observer by drawing
attention to two interwoven themes that the company goes to great
lengths to emphasize: allegiance to the Christian religion and unequiv-
ocal veneration of the institution of family.28  These company values
are not only pertinent to its owners, but they are also imposed upon
the customers and store employees.29  In the affirmation of its relig-
ious beliefs, the stores are closed on Sundays,30 and this fact is indi-
19. See Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2016). (The website states that the company is a private corporation.).
20. See, e.g., Renberg v. Zarrow, 667 P.2d 465, 471 (Okla. 1983) (“[C]lose corporations are
usually family affairs.”); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 1993) (“Shareholders
of close corporations are often family or close friends.”) (citing Bostock v. High Tech Elevator
Indus., Inc., 616 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)).
21. See Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (last vis-
ited May 19, 2017).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/hobby-
lobby-stores (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
25. Id.
26. Facebook had only 9,199 employees in as of May 2015. See The World’s Most Valuable
Brands, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/facebook (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
27. British Pertroleum made in $3.5 billion in profit in 2015. See id.
28. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.’s About Us section is written by using plural personal pronoun
“we” throughout the section, and it states that one of the company’s commitments is
“[p]roviding a return on the family’s investment.” See Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://
www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (last visited Apr. 18, 2016) (emphasis added).  The sec-
tion also reiterates the family’s commitment to the Christian faith, which is embodied into the
corporation’s main commitment to “[honor] the Lord . . . by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles.” Id.
29. Id. (“Serving our employees and their families by establishing a work environment and
company policies that build character, strengthen individuals, and nurture families.”).
30. Id.
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cated in multiple places on the company’s website, including the
Career section.31  Also, most of the stores are located outside of big
metropolitan areas, which indicates that the company primarily
targets more conservative, family-centered individuals.32  Family is
also at the heart of the corporate structure, as all of the governing
bodies of the corporation – the shareholders, the board of directors,
and the officers – are comprised exclusively of family members.33  For
example, the shareholders of the corporation are family trusts with
David and Barbara Green and their children as trustees.34  Also, the
board of directors and the executive officers consist of David Green
and his children.35  While the company’s corporate structure and the
nature of its ownership do not directly affect the public and those who
work for the company, the implementation of owners’ religious beliefs
in the corporate policy warrants more scrutiny as such application af-
fects a significant number of people due to the sheer size of the
corporation.
B. Religious Freedom in the United States
The religious rights debate is hardly new, but, despite much discus-
sion, many questions remain unanswered.  It has been an ongoing and
hotly contested issue since before the founding of the Union.36  Al-
though not originally part of the Constitution, the specific right to re-
ligious freedom was incorporated into the Bill of Rights in 1791.37 This
right imposed a limitation on the federal government stating, “Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”38  The philosophical underpin-
nings of the religious freedom and prohibition of state religion were
based on the idea of separation of church and state that dates back to
31. See, e.g., Store Management, HOBBY LOBBY, http://careers.hobbylobby.com/current-open-
ings/store-management (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
32. Phillip Bump, There Really Are Two Americas. An Urban One and a Rural One, WASH.
POST (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/10/21/there-really-
are-two-americas-a-urban-one-and-a-rural-one (discussing voters’ behavior in different areas of
the United States and concluding that the rural area residents tend to vote for the Republican
Party, a party known for its conservative stands on social and economic issues).
33. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 5-6
(2014).
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
36. Yvette Ann Walker, Note, More Than Human: Modern Expansion of Corporate Per-
sonhood Rights in Hobby Lobby, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 297, 305-06 (2015).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. Id.
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John Locke’s model of a secular state.39  The idea of a secular state
was also vigorously discussed among the Founders of the United
States.40  For instance, Thomas Jefferson coined the term “separation
of church and state” when he wrote a letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association in 180241 in which Jefferson referred to the idea as “build-
ing a wall of separation between Church & State.”42  This discussion
of the separation of church and state also had numerous critics on the
other side; for example, those who feared that their religious liberties
might be adversely affected, as the result of the implementation of the
separation of church and state doctrine.43  The result of this discussion
was the adoption of an amendment that combined both the Free Exer-
cise and the Establishment Clauses, precipitating a slew of future de-
bates – both in the academia and in jurisprudence – on how the two
clauses contradict each other.44  The struggles of reconciling the two
clauses and defining the contours of the Free Exercise clause shaped
the current state of the law in this area.
i. The Sherbert Times
The modern era of religious rights evolutionary history could be di-
vided into two distinct epochs: the Sherbert times and the Smith times.
In 1963, the Warren Court decided Sherbert v. Verner45 where it inter-
preted the Free Exercise Clause as requiring a balancing test: (1)
whether the contested law imposed a “substantial burden on the prac-
tice of religion” and (2), if so, whether the law “served a compelling
governmental interest.”46  This “strict scrutiny” test created a very ex-
acting inquiry into the purposes of the laws enacted by the govern-
ment if those laws burdened a person’s religious freedom, potentially
forcing the states to “single out . . . those [persons] whose behavior is
religiously motivated” arguably in “violat[ion of] the constitutional
39. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Re-
ligion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1430 (1990).
40. FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA
11 (2003).
41. DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 1-2 (2002).
42. Id. at 2.
43. See McConnell, supra note 39, at 1476 (“Virginia Baptists, John Leland, opposed ratifica-
tion [of the Constitution] on the ground that religious freedom was “not sufficiently secured.”).
44. See, e.g., Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 982 (1995)
(“‘[N]eutrality’ in establishment seems to contradict the need to prevent the establishment of
religion by government or to protect (and privilege) religious free exercise.”).
45. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398).
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limitations on state action.”47  These worries eventually took a central
stage, bringing about the transition to the current state of the law on
religious liberty.
ii. The Smith Times
Almost three decades after Sherbert, the U.S. Supreme Court issued
a watershed decision that sent shockwaves, which still reverberate
through political and legal discussions on religious liberty.  Written by
textualist and originalist, Justice Antonin Scalia, Employment Division
v. Smith48 curtailed the sweep of Sherbert by distinguishing it in a way
that significantly limited its reach.49  In Smith, the Court abandoned
the strict reading of the First Amendment’s religious freedom man-
date by, instead, announcing that the “compelling interest” test cannot
be applied to the laws of “general applicability” because “[a]ny soci-
ety adopting such a system would be courting anarchy.”50  This princi-
ple was later rearticulated as the new religious liberty test: “neutral,
generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even
when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”51  Al-
most immediately after the Supreme Court decided Smith, the new
rule was met with harsh criticism from both liberal and conservative
observers,52 preparing a fertile ground for a bipartisan Congressional
response.
Three years of criticism of Smith from all corners of the political
spectrum translated into a new and current era of religious liberty
rights.  In 1993, the House of Representatives introduced and passed
RFRA by a voice call, the Senate passed the Act by a huge 97 to 3
majority, and President William Clinton signed it into law– all within
less than a year.53 Congress’s vision of religious freedom was one that
predated Smith, so, in adopting RFRA, it restored the “substantial
47. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
49. Symposium, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 35, 54 (2015).
50. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
51. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997).
52. In 1990, the year when Smith, was decided, numerous newspapers printed opinions and
letters that criticized the decision and the Court. See, e.g., Editorial, Is Religious Liberty a Lux-
ury?, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/09/
15/is-religious-liberty-a-luxury/8a57b1df-3987-4d9f-95b2-b3426c22beff/?utm_
term=.a830da2f6721; Opinion, Endangered “Free Exercise” Clause, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
May 21, 1990, at 18; Letter to the Editor, Religious Freedom Threatened by Court Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1990, at A20.
53. H.R.1308 - Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.con
gress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308/all-actions?overview=closed#tabs (last visited May
8, 2017).
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burden” test.54  However, since the standard Congress did not agree
with was a constitutional standard,55 Congress created a dualism as to
the exercise of religious freedom when it adopted RFRA, which de-
fines religious freedom more broadly than the Constitution.  This du-
alism of current religious liberty law is a distinct feature of the post-
RFRA era, showcasing the inter-branch tension and uncertainty
within the branches as to what standard is supreme and producing a
dramatic resolution of high-stake issues such as insurance coverage for
women.
C. RFRA and The Hobby Lobby Case
Two separate federal laws clashed in the Supreme Court of the
United States on March 25, 2014, when Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. ar-
gued its case against the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Sylvia Burwell, centering insurance coverage and religious freedom as
the subject of the dispute.  On one side, there was RFRA, which pro-
hibits the government from
substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except [when the
government] demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
[and] is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.56
On the other side, there was the ACA, which imposed a “minimum
essential coverage” mandate upon corporations.57  The “minimum es-
sential coverage” consisted of providing a standard health insurance
plan that had to include contraception with, arguably, abortifacient
qualities.58  The composition of the insurance package brought the re-
ligious freedom discussion back to the Supreme Court.
The parties in Hobby Lobby had diametrically opposite views of the
role of religion in this case.  Hobby Lobby presented an argument
based on RFRA, but it also interestingly interwove some of the ele-
ments of the constitutional rights of the First Amendment.59  Hobby
54. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (citing congressional finding
that “[l]aws that are neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise.”) (internal quotations and punctuations omitted).
55. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997) (all three cases implicated the First
Amendment).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
57. I.R.C. § 5000A (2012).
58. Johnson, supra note 33, at 1.
59. See generally Brief for Respondent, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 546899.
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Lobby’s RFRA argument stated that by mandating the company to
purchase the abortifacients for their employees, the government “sub-
stantially burdened” its exercise of religion.60  Because the govern-
ment did not provide any justification that such burden was in
furtherance of a compelling government interest and did not show
that the government’s imposition of the burden represented the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest, such burden was illegal as
it violated RFRA.61  Hobby Lobby argued, therefore, they must be
exempt from this requirement of ACA by allowing the company to
exclude abortifacient contraceptives from insurance packages it pro-
vides for its employees.62  The constitutional argument consisted of an
assertion that the Supreme Court never said that First Amendment’s
religious exercise is “purely personal,” that is applicable only to indi-
viduals.63  It pushed further by comparing the applicability of the free
exercise to corporations as having the same rationale the Supreme
Court used in deciding free speech cases: the proper inquiry is “not
whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so,
whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead,
the question must be whether [the challenged law] abridges expres-
sion that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”64  Burwell, on
behalf of the government, disagreed with these arguments.
The Department of Human Services (“DHS”), the petitioner in the
case, also proposed constitutional and non-constitutional arguments.
According to DHS, the question of whether the exercise of religion is
applicable to for-profit organizations must be viewed under the consti-
tutional case law because “the text of neither RFRA nor the Diction-
ary Act supports the conclusion that for-profit corporations are
‘person[s]’ that themselves engage in the ‘exercise of religion’ in the
sense Congress intended.”65  Expanding on the idea that for-profit
corporations cannot exercise religious freedom rights, a bulk of DHS’s
argument was based on traditional principles governing corporate
structure: (1) a corporation is a separate entity from its owner and (2)
the shareholders of the corporation have no standing in bringing
60. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775-76 (showing that if the company were to decline the
coverage of the drugs, it would have to potentially pay $1.3 million per day).
61. Brief for Respondent, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No.
13-354), 2014 WL 546899, at *45, 56.
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id. at *24.
64. Id. at *25 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
65. Brief for Petitioner, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-
354), 2014 WL 173486, at *22.
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claims for injuries on behalf of the corporation.66  In addition, DHS
stated that even if RFRA’s strict scrutiny applied, the government met
its burdens because the government had compelling interests – protec-
tion of employees’ rights, public health considerations, and women’s
access to healthcare; further, the current framework is a least restric-
tive means of achieving the goals as the alternative Hobby Lobby of-
fered – government itself could distribute contraceptives to Hobby
Lobby’s employees – would require creation or expansion of federal
programs, which is not required by RFRA.67  The Supreme Court was
not persuaded by DHS’s argument.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court sided with Hobby Lobby,
shattering the long-standing principles of constitutional and corporate
law.  First, the Supreme Court did not overrule the “laws of general
applicability” standard espoused in Smith.68   By relying solely on
RFRA, the Supreme Court established the following groundbreaking
rules: (1) the Court rejected the notion that the purpose of a corpora-
tion is mere profit-making, endorsing a modern approach69 of setting
up corporations “for any legitimate purpose”;70 (2) the Court also re-
jected the proposition that a for-profit corporation “cannot engage in
the exercise of religion,” stating that the statutory language that au-
thorizes construction of exercise of religion “in favor of a broad pro-
tection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the
terms of [RFRA] and the Constitution” should not mean to impose
restrictions on “exercise of religion”;71 and (3) by assuming that
ACA’s mandate served a “compelling governmental interest,”72 the
Court found that imposition of penalties was not “least restrictive”
because the government had alternative measures for the same situa-
tion in a non-profit setting.73  The Court’s holding, in essence, subordi-
nated the ACA to RFRA’s strict scrutiny analysis, opening the door
for a plethora of robust academic and political discussion on the un-
derlying issues.
66. Id. at *23-28.
67. Id. at *38-58.
68. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (“The contraceptive
mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory
question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim.”) (The majority points out
that RFRA, as amended, does not implicate First Amendment issues; therefore Smith is not
controlling here.).
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2015) (“A corporation may be incorporated or organ-
ized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”).
70. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
71. Id. at 2772.
72. Id. at 2780.
73. Id. at 2782.
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III. A QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF RFRA.
To bring order in the federalist system where a vast number of legis-
lative acts, both federal and state, exists side by side, courts regularly
treat some acts as having more authority than others.  Of course, a
regular practice for the Supreme Court to employ such subordination
in Constitutional cases when the Supreme Court evaluates whether a
particular act of a state legislature is in sync with the supreme law of
the land.74  For example, in Smith, the Supreme Court looked closely
at the act of the Oregon Legislature that denied unemployment bene-
fits to people who were fired for consuming peyote – a type of cactus
with psychoactive qualities used by Native Americans for religious
purposes.75  The state law in that case needed to conform with the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, namely the Religious Free-
dom Clause.76  In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Oregon
law was not in violation the federal Constitution.77  Similarly, in Sher-
bert, the Supreme Court looked whether South Carolina unemploy-
ment benefits statute complies with the First Amendment Religious
Freedom Clause when the benefits are denied to those people who
celebrate the Sabbath and because of this religious principle cannot
find a job, holding that the statute was unconstitutional.78  The Su-
preme Court, however, is not limited to subordinating state laws to
the Constitution.
All federal laws issued by Congress and the executive branch of the
government are also subordinated to the U.S. Constitution.  The
prime example of such hierarchy is the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Windsor,79 where the Court invalidated a provision of
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)80 that amended the Diction-
ary Act by defining marriage as only between a man and a woman.81
In Windsor, the Supreme Court used both the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause82 to find DOMA unconstitutional.  Similarly, in Kore-
74. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas law that criminalizing abor-
tion-related activities on the basis that it was not consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution).
75. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1963).
79. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
80. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, (codified in
scattered sections of 1 and 28 U.S.C.).
81. Id. § 7.
82. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
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matsu v. United States,83 the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a presidential executive order that provided for
the creation of internment camps for people of Japanese ancestry liv-
ing in the United States during World War II, holding that the execu-
tive order was constitutionally valid and thus showing that all
executive documents have to be in compliance with the Constitu-
tion.84  The power of the Supreme Court to subordinate law does not
end here either.
Finally, the Supreme Court also has the authority to subordinate
state constitutions to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution.  This au-
thority is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.85  One of the most prominent examples is Romer v. Evans86 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to the Colorado
constitution that took out sexual orientation from the protected class
designation, as defined by the Supreme Court.87  Again, deciding
Romer, the Supreme Court relied both on the Supremacy Clause and
on the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution to invalidate
the amendment to the Colorado Constitution.88  These examples illus-
trate that all state and federal laws, including state constitutions, are
subject to Supreme Court’s constitutional scrutiny, yielding their
power to the U.S. Constitution if the law is in conflict with it.
Against this backdrop, Hobby Lobby appears to be an odd case.
First, the Supreme Court did not use the Constitution as the standard
for comparison; instead, the Court used RFRA as the golden standard
to invalidate the ACA provision, putting aside the Constitutional ar-
guments of the parties as inapposite.89  As the majority wrote, “The
contraceptive mandate [of the ACA], as applied to closely held corpo-
rations, violates RFRA.”90  According to the Supreme Court Justices,
both the majority and dissent, RFRA has the supreme authority akin
the U.S. Constitution. Such treatment is unwarranted because RFRA
was adopted as a regular act of Congress, avoiding special mechanisms
of higher scrutiny that would elevate its status above all other laws
83. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
84. Id. at 223-24.
85. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
86. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
87. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
88. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
89. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2790 (2014).
90. Id. at 2785 (emphasis added).
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and just under the Constitution; thus, the outcome, in this case, is in-
accurate and must be corrected as it could create a disruption in the
hierarchy of law.
A. RFRA and ACA stand on equal footing
i. Hierarchy within hierarchy
Naturally, the U.S. Constitution sits atop of the hierarchy of law,
subordinating the rest of the law. The Founding Fathers established
this paradigm by inserting the Supremacy Clause into the Constitu-
tion.91  But the Constitution is a very brief document that cannot
cover all areas of law; it could only set a philosophical framework and
grant powers to different political bodies to elaborate on the meaning
of its terms.  The Constitution, thus, directs Congress to take measures
in making the Constitutional principles workable, not merely declara-
tory, in our society.92  But even acts of Congress could become mere
declarations if not enforced, and they could also be too broad to cover
all situations that arise in the real world; it is for this reason, the Con-
stitution created the executive branch to execute the Constitution and
the acts of Congress by issuing regulations that implement the con-
gressional acts.93  As these laws have different power depending on
where on the hierarchical ladder they are situated, their adoption and
amending processes also differ.
The degree of ease with which a legislative document could be
changed should arguably give the document considerably more or less
weight.  The U.S. Constitution, for example, is an extremely difficult
document to amend.  Since the Constitution was adopted in 1789, only
27 amendments were fully ratified and took effect, and it took over
200 years to ratify the last amendment entirely.94  Such rigidity is due
to a particular procedure established by the Constitution that needs to
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
92. See, e.g., Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (It is the power of
Congress . . . to enforce the [constitutional] prohibitions by appropriate legislation.”).
93. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (“[Administrative acts] do not con-
stitute an interpretation of the Act or a standard for judging factual situations which binds a
district court’s processes, as an authoritative pronouncement of a higher court might do.  But the
Administrator’s policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized
experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case.  They do determine the policy which will guide applications for enforcement by
injunction on behalf of the Government. Good administration of the . . . require that the stan-
dards of public enforcement and those for determining private rights shall be at variance only
where justified by very good reasons.”).
94. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 724, 735 (1995) (explaining the difficulties of
amending constitutional provisions).
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follow in order to amend the Constitution.95  Congressional acts, on
the other hand, are much easier to change: a bill must be approved by
a simple majority of both houses of the Congress and signed by the
President.96  In the case of federal regulations, the President, for in-
stance, may unilaterally issue an executive order, and he also may uni-
laterally rescinded such an order.97  These procedures are logically
consistent with the weight the courts give to each of these acts, but
these procedures do not address an issue of whether the acts of the
same body may have different weight as was the case in Hobby
Lobby.
Conceivably, some acts of Congress of the same nature98 may have
more weight during judicial review than others.  An example of such
law could be one that has an embedded requirement of a
supermajority vote to change it, that is, where Congress, itself, limits
its ability to modify the law.  In the Immigration and Nationality
Act,99 Congress created a provision that to change any norm that con-
verts immigration status of a person from that of the Temporary Pro-
tected to that of the Permanent Resident, the Senate must obtain
“three-fifths of the Members duly chosen and sworn.”100  This lan-
guage is indicative of the Congress’s intent that the provision in the
statute should be construed narrowly, having some precedence over
other provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act that regulate
obtaining Permanent Resident status by people in all other immigrant
categories.  This superiority is warranted because if Congress wanted
to ascribe a different meaning to some of the terms in that section, it
would have done so only if the requisite number of votes was ensured.
95. U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hun-
dred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the
first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.”) (emphasis added).
96. The Legislative Process. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. http://www.house.gov/con-
tent/learn/legislative_process (last visted Apr. 18, 2016).
97. KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDEN-
TIAL POWERS, 36 (2001) (“Since executive orders are a tool of the president’s executive power,
their reach extends as far as executive power itself.”).
98. A Bill that later becomes a binding law is of a different nature from a Resolution that is
never binding but is only of an instructive character.
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
100. Id. § 1254a.
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Whenever courts interpret laws, therefore, they should take these
Congressional directives into account, and RFRA is not an exception.
Although when Congress adopted RFRA it wanted to resurrect old
case law, this does not afford RFRA a higher status than that of other
laws.  It is true that RFRA’s adoption was a response to Smith, which
abolished the two-prong test established in Sherbert.101  Since Sher-
bert, and the line of cases that followed dealing with the First Amend-
ment issue, it could be argued that when Congress adopted RFRA, it
meant to give it a quasi-Constitutional status; Congress even im-
planted a reference to the First Amendment into the original stat-
ute.102  It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court, in City of
Boerne v. Flores,103 invalidated RFRA as applied to states because of
this reference,104 as it was an “attempt [of] a substantive change in
constitutional protections.”105  The Court said that the “legislation
which alters the Free Exercise Clause’s meaning cannot be said to be
enforcing the Clause” because “Congress does not enforce a constitu-
tional right by changing what the right is.”106  The Court then con-
cluded that the Constitution strives to “maintain[ ] the traditional
separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary, depriving
Congress of any power to interpret and elaborate on its meaning by
conferring self-executing substantive rights against the States, and
thereby leaving the interpretive power with the Judiciary.”107  Al-
though RFRA still applies on the federal level, this position of the
Court eventually created more political discussion in Congress.
In a relentless attempt to correct the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of religious freedom, once again at issue in Flores, Congress
adopted another version of RFRA.  The new law received the name
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,108
as it was designed to create an exception from Flores for religious
lands and institutions.  In this version, Congress removed any refer-
ence to the First Amendment109 by amending the old RFRA in the
101. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
102. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, § 5, 107 Stat 1488
(“‘[E]xercise of religion’ means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution.”) (codified in scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.).
103. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
104. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014).
105. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
106. Id. at 508.
107. Id.
108. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 2000cc).
109. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
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“exercise of religion definition”110 to overcome the Supreme Court’s
criticism of the original RFRA.111  Nothing else was changed.  Indeed,
Congress still interpreted the First Amendment by adopting the law
only without directly referencing it.  However, comparing the earlier
version of RFRA to  the amended RFRA actually demoted  its status
compared to other laws because it lost its seemingly direct relation to
the Constitution that made it a so-called quasi-constitutional act.  The
amended RFRA, therefore, should have become equal among equals
in the realm of acts passed by Congress, as it did not require any
supermajority for the amending process and it was not related to the
Constitution in any way that could afford it a higher status.
ii. The Policeman of the Laws
Congress made RFRA a policeman of the entire federal legal
framework.  The Act contains a rather unusual provision that states,
RFRA applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that
law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or
after November 16, 1993 . . . . Federal statutory law adopted after
November 16, 1993 is subject to this chapter unless such law explic-
itly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.112
Two noteworthy observations warrant some attention here: (1) in
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court never referred to this provision to
establish the superiority of RFRA over the ACA and (2) it seems like
the provision does away with the long-standing presumption of Con-
gressional knowledge of the prior law.113  This provision appears to
give RFRA a quasi-constitutional status.
Although RFRA’s language is expansive and unambiguous, its ap-
plication creates absurd results.  For example, the statute makes itself
applicable to “all Federal and State law, and the implementation of
that law, whether statutory or otherwise.”114  The first anomaly of this
statement is that all law, whether it has a direct effect on the religious
freedom or a law of general applicability such as ACA or tax law, that
was adopted before RFRA would be subject to RFRA, which would
110. RFRA defined “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution,” but the new law defined “exercise of religion” as “includ[ing] any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2012).
111. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2012)
113. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) (“[I]t is not only appropriate but also
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important prece-
dents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in
conformity with them.”).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2012).
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create a situation when no one knows what the state of that law is
because it could potentially be violating someone’s “religious free-
dom.”  This uncertainty would last until Congress amends all the law
by “explicitly exclud[ing RFRA’s] application”115 or until the Su-
preme Court finds the laws to be in conformity with RFRA.  Al-
though this effect might seem revolutionary and potentially
destabilizing, Congress has the power to change old law, so this kind
of negative impact might not be as controversial as some other side
effect of RFRA might produce.
One of the other potential side effects is an attempt to correct the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the law.  The reading of the law116
unambiguously subjects Supreme Courts’ decisions – i.e. federal law –
to the strictures of RFRA.  But the Supreme Court in Flores117 stated
that Congress is “depriv[ed] of any power to interpret and elabo-
rate”118 on constitutional principles.  For example, Supreme Court’s
decision on same sex-marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges,119 the Court re-
affirmed that marriage is a constitutional right that the states cannot
deny under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.120  Thus, this decision makes any discrimi-
nation against same-sex couples unlawful, but, as the reality shows,121
the objections to this decision could be based on RFRA’s provisions
that presumably protect “religious freedom.”  Since the decision in
Obergefell has become the law of the land, it falls under RFRA’s pur-
view because the Act refers to all “state and federal law . . . statutory
or otherwise.”122  The question arises whether a governmental entity,
to which RFRA still applies, or a close corporation, may deny a right
announced in Obergefell because its workers hold religious beliefs that
strongly disfavor any same-sex relationships.  In light of RFRA, can
this Supreme Court’s decision withstand strict scrutiny?123  And if it
does not, can RFRA override the Supreme Court’s decision?  Most
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
118. Id. at 506.
119. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
120. Id. at 2590.
121. A Kentucky Clerk, Kim Davis refused to issue licenses to same-sex couples, citing “Ap-
ostolic Christian beliefs” in justification of her actions,” which define marriage between a man
and a woman only. See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, Defiant Kentucky Clerk Jailed for Refusing to
Issue Same-Sex Marriage Licenses: Kim Davis Cites ‘God’s Authority’ for Her Actions in the Face
of Court Rulings, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/defiant-kentucky-
clerk-to-appear-in-court-over-refusal-to-issue-same-sex-marriage-licenses-1441295805.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2012).
123. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (stating that “it is the rare case in which . . .
a law survives strict scrutiny.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB204.txt unknown Seq: 18 19-JUN-17 13:07
202 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:185
likely, the Obergefell decision will stand because the Obergefell rule is
an interpretation of constitutional provisions while RFRA is just an
act of Congress.  However, the conflict of the two laws is very appar-
ent and difficult to reconcile.  Perhaps understanding the broad mean-
ing of RFRA precluded the Supreme Court from even mentioning the
particular “supremacy” provision in Hobby Lobby decision.  Under-
standably, the Supreme Court has more freedom to avoid following
RFRA, but Congress has limited its freedom and, thus, must follow its
strictures.
The post-RFRA reality demonstrations that even Congress seems
to forget what that law is about.  To avoid the possibility of future
conflict with RFRA, Congress has to affirmatively state an exception
from RFRA’s application in the text of a new bill.124  This require-
ment seems nonsensical in that even Congress, the legislative body
that adopted RFRA, does not follow this requirement.125  A more
compelling reason that makes this provision of RFRA a mere absurd-
ity is RFRA itself, which establishes strict scrutiny, the test that the
Supreme Court itself called one of the most exacting.126 Under
RFRA, all law is subject to RFRA’s strict scrutiny, yet Congress has
an out, in that it only has to exclude RFRA’s applicability from law.127
Such an incongruous and ambiguous nature of RFRA cannot make it
more superior to all laws, save the Constitution itself; it seems that
both the Supreme Court and Congress are of the same view because
they either do not recognize the provision or do not follow it in its
practice.  Therefore, RFRA is just like any other law, and the Su-
preme Court erred when it invalidated the ACA’s provision because
of RFRA.
B. ACA potentially has more overriding power than RFRA
The ACA, arguably, has more power than RFRA. The ACA could
be viewed more authoritative for at least two reasons: (1) the ACA
was upheld as a constitutionally valid law passed under Congress’s
taxing authority, while RFRA’s adoption as related to enumerated
powers was not challenged, and, in fact, a provision was held unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court on other grounds, and (2), ACA was
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2012).
125. ACA, for example, does not contain such language.  It is highly unlikely to be due to
oversight because dozens of lawyers and thousands of hours of work that were put into the ACA
would ensure that it would conform to such a simple requirement as providing a disclaimer in its
text.
126. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2012).
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adopted later, so Congress at least knew about RFRA and did not
mean for its provisions to clash, hence the non-profit exceptions.  It
would be a ridiculous idea for Congress to adopt such a comprehen-
sive law as the ACA, and yet did not account for a possible challenge
under RFRA that could ultimately destroy it.
Congress can only pass laws that are within its power as delegated
by the Constitution.  This principle is embedded in the Constitution as
a compromise between the separate states and the federal govern-
ment: while the federal government has some power over states, the
states enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy when it comes to reg-
ulating their own relations – this is a central principle of federalism.128
The Supreme Court has long been reluctant to interpret any provi-
sions of the Constitution in the manner that expands the reach of the
federal government,129 although some jurisprudence has expanded the
federal government considerably130 compared to what it had been at
the time the Constitution was ratified.131  Regardless, however, of the
historical background of the Supreme Court’s use of the “enumerated
powers” doctrine, all acts that stem from Congress ought to be within
Congress’s authority as provided by the Constitution.  RFRA, there-
fore, is not exempted from this scrutiny.
RFRA falling within one the enumerated powers of Congress is at
best nebulous.  When RFRA was a bill, Congress did not explicitly
indicate under which enumerated power it enacted the bill into law.132
From first glance, it could be said that RFRA is adopted under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to facilitate the implementation of the
rights afforded under the First Amendment.  However, the problem
128. The Constitution limits the powers of Congress in at least two places: Article I where it
lists the types of affairs Congress could get involved in and the Tenth Amendment where the
Constitution reserves all powers that are not enumerated to the states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
(listing the powers of Congress); U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
129. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (stating that Congress overstepped its
Commerce Clause power when it adopted the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 that prohib-
ited carrying weapons in school zones).
130. See, e,g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (prohibiting dis-
crimination on the private business facilities by the means of the Commerce Clause); Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding a federal law regulation of marijuana within the separate
states under the Commerce Clause of Constitution).
131. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (“This government is acknowledged by
all, to be one of enumerated powers.  The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted
to it, would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that
principle is now universally admitted.”) (emphasis added).
132. The preamble of RFRA only indicates that the law is “to protect the free exercise of
religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
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with this understanding is that the Supreme Court explicitly noted
that Congress overstepped its authority by adopting RFRA as a First
Amendment law.133  The Supreme Court never addressed the ques-
tion of whether Congress was authorized by the Constitution to pass
RFRA, but absent any indication that the law is to facilitate interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause,134 the law has a good chance
to be stricken as beyond Congress’s powers.  When the Supreme
Court looked at the ACA, however, it considered the authority of
Congress to pass it.
ACA’s validity is unquestionable since the Supreme Court has al-
ready conducted an exacting inquiry into the matter.  In National Fed-
eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius,135 the Supreme Court
heard the Federation’s argument that Congress did not have the req-
uisite constitutional authority to adopt the ACA in general and to re-
quire a purchase of insurance in particular.136  The Supreme Court in
that case rejected the argument and held that the law was passed
within Congress’s Tax and Spending authority137 and is therefore con-
stitutional.138  The Supreme Court also held that Congress could not
have passed the ACA under the Commercial Clause authority be-
cause that provision of the Constitution “does not authorize Congress
to direct them to purchase particular products in those or other mar-
kets today.”139  This holding was unambiguous as it was approved by a
5 to 4 majority of the Court confirming the constitutional validity of
this law.
When the two acts – RFRA and ACA – are compared from the
point of credibility before the Supreme Court, there is not a question
that the ACA is viewed more favorably.  Therefore, RFRA should be
challenged on the “enumerated powers” grounds to test its validity in
the eyes of the Supreme Court.  Before that is done, the Supreme
Court should not elevate RFRA above any other law of Congress,
especially the one that has already passed that scrutiny from the Su-
preme Court.
133. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
134. Commerce Clause interpretation is very broad, and the use of it was authorized by the
Supreme Court in many cases from direct regulation of commerce, to elimination of discrimina-
tion, and even to drug regulations.
135. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
136. Id.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Wel-
fare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States.”) (emphasis added).
138. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
139. Id. at 2590-91.
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C. Long term effect of the Hobby Lobby Decision
Although limited in some respects, the decision in Hobby Lobby
creates a threat of legalization of some forms of discrimination as well
as producing a discord in our state and federal legal system.  First of
all, although the Supreme Court indicated that the decision was lim-
ited to the family-operated, closely held corporations,140 the Court
went to great lengths explaining that there is no difference between
for-profit and non-for-profit corporations as far as RFRA concerns.141
This is a signal to all jurisdictions that in the future they should find no
distinction as well should a similar claim arise.  The Supreme Court
was skeptical that such a situation could transpire142 because the real-
ity is such that large corporations are composed of shareholders that
hold various religious beliefs or none at all,143 but it is not difficult to
imagine that those shareholders of different beliefs could find a com-
mon understanding for discriminations based on religious grounds.
For example, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and some other religions all
condemn homosexuality and abortion.144  Shareholders who belong to
those religions could agree among themselves that they will not pro-
vide some services to LGBTQ and women who have gotten abortions
and later argue that RFRA protects them because of the unifying to
all religions sincerely held belief.  This argument could only be pro-
posed in a federal court as the Hobby Lobby decision applies exclu-
sively to the federal government,145 but the threat of discrimination is
not limited to the federal government alone.
On the state level, some states have adopted similar legislation to
RFRA that loom over the equal treatment of people in those states.
Since the decision in Hobby Lobby, many states have followed suit
and adopted similar laws, imposing strictures of strict scrutiny on all
types of infringement on religion.146  Although the state courts do not
need to follow Hobby Lobby in interpreting state RFRAs,147 many
states where these laws were adopted are conservative states with
140. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2776 (2014).
141. Alex J. Luchenitser, Religious Accomodation in the Age of Civil Rights: A New Era of
Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 63, 66-67 (2015).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. David Masci & Michael Lipka, Where Christian Churches, Other Religions Stand on Gay
Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (2015) (showing various religions’ attitudes toward homosexual-
ity); Georgette Benntet, Abortion: Whose Religious Beliefs Should Prevail? HUFFINGTON POST
(2014) (analyzing various religions’ attitudes toward abortion).
145. See Luchenitser, supra note 146, at 71.
146. Id. (listing some of the state statutes that resemble RFRA).
147. Id.
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elected state judges;148 it is, therefore, very likely that those state
judges will not interpret the state RFRA more liberally than the Su-
preme Court did. Hobby Lobby, thus, created a sample for the state
of how to beat the antidiscrimination laws by coating them with the
protection-of-religious-beliefs glaze.
Some scholars also noted adverse socio-economic effects that
Hobby Lobby could potentially introduce.  On the one hand, the deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby does not only affect the health of women, but it
also affects the rights of LGBTQ community in the United States.149
Moreover, it affects these rights in a more direct way than it affects
the right to abortion because the right to abortion is already well es-
tablished in the United States legal system whereas LGBTQ rights are
still in the recognition process.150  One example of such hostility
through a use of Hobby Lobby to circumvent equality is an Indiana
legislation that was clearly directed against the rights of LGBTQ com-
munity of that state.151  As there are skeptics to whom personal rights
are no more than esoteric concepts, they should also worry about
RFRA and its implications as it might dramatically affect their eco-
nomic well-being.
On the other hand, Hobby Lobby disrupts a status quo within the
realm of economic and business relationships within the Nation’s mar-
ketplace.  For a long time the commercial marketplace was viewed
through the lens of “doux commerce,”152 which announced that com-
merce is a “‘sociable institution and can be expected to cultivate vir-
tues’ conducive to life in a diverse society.”153  Commerce’s input in
fostering equality and tolerance is enormously undermined by Hobby
Lobby because the decision made commerce a part of heated social
issues.154  Another aspect of this issue is that religion is artificially ex-
tracted from the private zone of social life into the commercial life
that historically excluded any mention of religion.155  Such expansive
intrusion into the established social and economic order is the most
148. Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE
STATES,. http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheck
dam.pdf (compiling a survey of the states with elective state judges positions).
149. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 172 (2014).
150. See id. at 176.
151. Amanda Terkel, Indiana Governor Signs Anti-Gay “Religious Freedom” Bill at Private
Ceremony, HUFFINGTON POST (2015) (describing the Indiana law’s history and purpose and stat-
ing its possible discriminatory effects on people of both different faith and sexual orientation
from that of the business owner).
152. “Soft trade” – literally from French.
153. See Horwitz, supra note 154, at 177.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 178.
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troubling outcome the Supreme Court has produced since Plessy v.
Ferguson156 when, for the first time, discrimination based on race was
formally legalized.  With Hobby Lobby, as it stands now, the Supreme
Court placed a burden on a customer to conduct an extensive inquiry
into the religious background of grocery store owners or else suffer
embarrassment and humiliation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Hobby Lobby was an erroneous decision by the Supreme Court be-
cause it ignored the cannons of the legislative and judicial process by
putting RFRA above all other law.  Congress created, and the Su-
preme Court legitimized, a law that established a principal that is
equal in force to a constitutional principal.  Such laws are allowed, of
course, if they are correctly named and the proper procedure of their
promulgation is followed.  If Congress wanted to give the strict scru-
tiny test as applied to the Freedom of Religion Clause, the force it has
in RFRA, Congress should have proposed it as an amendment to the
Constitution.  Once the amendment was properly introduced, it would
have to have undergone a process of ratification by the states.157  Only
after this process is followed can the law have the effect that RFRA
has under Hobby Lobby.  Otherwise, if Congress is allowed to pass
laws of the constitutional weight without following the amendment
procedure, the value and authority of the Constitution would be close
to nothing, which would uproot the tremendous work put into estab-
lishing our federal system by the Founding Fathers.  The Supreme
Court has made mistakes in the past, but it has been able to correct
them and regain the respect of the People to its institution.  The deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby was just that – a mistake that needs to be fixed.
The Founding Fathers adopted the First Amendment in 1791 to pro-
tect people’s most cherished freedoms such as the freedom of speech
and the freedom of religion from the government’s interference.
Since those times and until today, the First Amendment is considered
156. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
157. See U.S. Const. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments,
which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate.”).
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to be “the most important part of the Bill of Rights.”158  Any changes
to it, therefore, need much consideration and a robust discussion not
only in Congress but also among the states.  Before this process be-
gins, the Supreme Court is the only body that could interpret the
meaning of the Amendment; in the case of “religious freedom” the
Supreme Court made it very clear that strict scrutiny is not the test
that is used to limit government’s action.  As for the debate about
whether a corporation can hold religious beliefs, only one remark
could be made in this Comment: around the time the United States
Constitution was created, corporations, as a form of organization,
were only available to the government,159 so if the Founding Fathers
considered the First Amendment to be applicable to corporations,
such consideration would have been of the nature that the First
Amendment protects the freedom of religion from corporations, not
otherwise.
158. Constitution USA with Peter Sagal: The First & Second Amendments (PBS series), PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/tpt/constitution-usa-peter-sagal/rights/first-and-second-amendments (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2016).
159. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Neofeudalism: The Surprising Foundations of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 2017 U. ILL. L. REC. 163, 171 (2017) (“In the early years after indepen-
dence, states granted corporate charters for public works of infrastructure, such as bridges, turn-
pikes, colleges, and banks, which were thought to be beyond the capacities of private enterprise.
Every charter had a quasi-governmental aspect, creating a ‘body politic’ to pursue a public task,
often with special privileges stemming from its quasi-sovereign form.”).
